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DEFEASIBLE FEES, STATE ACTION, AND THE LEGACY
OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE
JONATHAN L. ENTIN*
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently upheld the validity of a
whites-only provision in an educational trust. The decision in Her-
mitage Methodist Homes of Virginia, Inc. v. Dominion Trust Co.,
would be noteworthy for that reason alone. It is important for
three other reasons, however. First, this was not an ordinary prop-
erty dispute; it arose directly from Brown v. Board of Education.2
The restriction at issue applied to a segregation academy in Prince
Edward County, the most recalcitrant of the defendants in Brown.
The academy was established to provide private education for
whites when the county closed its public schools rather than com-
ply with an order to desegregate. Remarkably, the segregation
academy was the party challenging the racial restriction.
Second, the result turned explicitly upon the formal distinction
between limitations and conditions subsequent, an especially ar-
cane aspect of the law of defeasible fees. The logic of the opinion
suggested that racial restrictions embodied in limitations might be
immune from constitutional attack, whereas identical restrictions
embodied in conditions subsequent would be infirm. It is troubling
that this essentially semantic distinction, which has long been crit-
icized by commentators on other grounds, could be used to afford a
constitutional safe harbor for perpetrators of racial discrimination.
Third, the case illustrates the sometimes mischievous allure of
constitutional argument when less glamorous, but more service-
able, principles from traditional property and trust law would have
disposed of the controversy in a more satisfactory fashion. Al-
though these analytical deficiencies probably did not affect the
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. Laura Chisolm, William Marshall,
Karen Nelson Moore, and participants in colloquia at the Mandel Center for Nonprofit Or-
ganizations and Howard University Law School offered valuable suggestions on previous
drafts, but the author bears full responsibility for all remaining errors and omissions.
1. 387 S.E.2d 740 (Va.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 907 (1990).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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outcome in this instance, at least one major recent civil rights case,
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,3 might have been lost because
the parties paid insufficient attention to common law legal theory 4
The lessons of Hermitage Methodist Homes, then, could have
broader application.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I gives an overview of
the law of defeasible fees and the limitation-condition distinction
that loomed so large in the Hermitage Methodist Homes case. Part
II critically analyzes that case, suggesting an alternative approach
based upon a unified law of defeasible fees that would have led to
the same outcome without the troubling implications contained m
the state supreme court's opinion. Part III explores the constitu-
tional implications of the elusive distinction between limitations
and conditions subsequent and suggests some appropriate features
for a unified law of defeasible fees. Part IV examines alternative
arguments based upon traditional property and trust law princi-
ples that were neglected by the parties and the court in Hermitage
Methodist Homes. Finally, Part V concludes that this case, despite
(or perhaps because of) its atypical factual setting, can promote
clearer understanding of the problems of defeasible-fee law.
I. DEFEASIBLE FEES AND THE LIMITATION-CONDITION DISTINCTION
The basic principles of the law of defeasible fees can be illus-
trated through the following example. Suppose that 0 owns Black-
acre in fee simple absolute. If 0 conveys the property "to A and
her heirs so long as tobacco is not used on the premises," A will
have acquired fee simple determinable 5 and 0 will have retained a
possibility of reverter.6 The no-tobacco restriction will be called a
special limitation.7 On the other hand, if 0 conveys the property
"to A and her heirs on the express condition that tobacco is not
used on the premises," A will have acquired fee simple subject to a
3. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
4. See Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance: Patterson and
a State Law Alternative, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 431, 433 & n.16, 446 (1990).
5. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 44 (1936).
6. Id. § 154(3).
7. Id. § 23.
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condition subsequent8 and 0 will have retained a power of termi-
nation.' The restriction in this instance will be called, unsurpris-
ingly, a condition subsequent. 10
Other than nomenclature, how do these conveyances differ le-
gally9 The traditional answer has to do with what happens if A
were to violate the no-tobacco restriction. Her fee simple determi-
nable would end at the instant she lit a cigarette, whereas her fee
simple subject to condition subsequent would end only when 0 or
his successor chose to invoke the power of termination. 1
As Professor Allison Dunham pointed out forty years ago,12 this
traditional answer rests upon an implausibly bifurcated view of A's
behavior. As holder of fee simple determinable, A would meekly
surrender her interest to a startled 0 and voluntarily leave Black-
acre; as holder of fee simple subject to condition subsequent, she
would seek to conceal her smoking from an ever-vigilant 0 lest he
force her off the property. In fact, 0 and A are likely to act in the
same way whatever labels are attached to their interests.18 Finding
that these legal labels reflect no important differences and that
courts frequently misapply the labels in any event, Professor Dun-
ham recommended that the formal distinction between fees simple
determinable and fees simple subject to condition subsequent be
8. Id. § 45. Although this section of the Restatement suggests that the conveyance must
explicitly provide for termination by the grantor or his successors in interest, the language
in the text is sufficient to create a fee simple subject to condition subsequent. Id. cmt. 1. I
have chosen this particular wording for ease of exposition. The analysis would not differ if
the conveyance were "to A and her heirs on condition that tobacco is not used on the prem-
ises, but if tobacco is ever used there 0 or Ins successors in interest shall have the right to
enter and terminate the estate herein granted."
9. Id. § 155. Under earlier terminology, O's retained interest might also be called a right
of entry or right of reentry for condition broken. Id. § 24 cmt. b, special note; 1 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.6, at 419 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). The earlier terminology still
enjoys wide currency. THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND
AND FuTURE INTERESTS 59 n.8 (2d ed. 1984).
10. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 24. There is a third variety of defeasible fee, the fee
simple subject to executory limitation, in which the property is automatically forfeited to a
third party upon breach of the restriction. Id. § 46. The interest at issue in Hermitage
Methodist Homes was a fee simple subject to executory limitation. See infra notes 18-24
and accompanying text.
11. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 44(b), 45(b).
12. Allison Dunham, Possibility of Reverter and Powers of Termination-Fraternal or
Identical Twins?, 20 U. CHL L. REv. 215 (1953).
13. Id. at 215-16.
19931
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abandoned.14 Numerous commentators have agreed with this
recommendation. 5
There is one potentially significant difference between these de-
feasible fees that has not received much attention. Because a fee
simple determinable expires automatically, no governmental action
is required to give effect to O's possibility of reverter should A vio-
late the special limitation. By contrast, a fee simple subject to con-
dition subsequent continues until the power of termination is exer-
cised, typically by O's filing suit in response to A's breach. Judicial
enforcement of the condition is a form of governmental action that
might raise constitutional concerns.
On closer examination, however, the limitation-condition dis-
tinction lacks coherence. If Professor Dunham was correct, 0 prob-
ably will ask a court to decide that A's violation of the no-tobacco
restriction entitles him to possession of Blackacre; 0 is most un-
likely to engage in self-help regardless of how the parties' interests
are denominated. It is a mere formality that in one case the court
will rule that 0 was entitled to possession from the instant A
breached and in the other will rule that 0 may take possession
upon the entry of final judgment on the merits. Until the court
makes its decision, A will retain possession in either scenario.' 6
Constitutional questions should not turn upon such an evanescent
distinction, especially when that distinction has so little to com-
mend itself on other grounds. The Hermitage Methodist Homes
decision serves as a reminder that this is not a purely hypothetical
point.
14. Id. at 233-34.
15. See, e.g., Peter Devonshire, Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Re-entry for Con-
dition Broken: The Modern Context for Determinable and Conditional Interests in Land,
13 DALHOUSIE L.J. 650, 680-81, 682 (1990); Gerald Korngold, For Unifying Servitudes and
Defeasible Fees: Property Law's Functional Equivalents, 66 TEx. L. REv. 533 (1988); Law-
rence W Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A Proposal for Legislative
Action, 85 HARv. L. REv. 729, 752-53, 759-60 (1972).
Two states have adopted legislation embodying this recommendation. See infra note 89.
16. One possible difference between a fee simple determinable and a fee simple subject to
condition subsequent relates to the time from which 0 may recover mesne profits. This
difference is more theoretical than real in many jurisdictions. Dunham, supra note 12, at
219. In any event, it is not significant enough to justify preserving the limitation-condition
distinction. Id. at 233.
[Vol. 34:769
1993] DEFEASIBLE FEES AND STATE ACTION
I. THE HERMITAGE METHODIST HOMES LITIGATION'
The Virginia litigation involved a conveyance by a man named
Jack Adams to the Prince Edward School Foundation "[s]o long as
[it] admits to any school, operated or supported by it, only mem-
bers of the White Race.""' The conveyance provided for gifts over
to three other educational institutions, all subject to the same ra-
cial restriction, and ultimately to a nursing home; the provision for
the nursing home said nothing about race.' 9
As a preliminary matter, this conveyance differed from the hypo-
thetical defeasible fees described earlier in that the future interest
was held by a third party rather than the grantor.20 The convey-
ance is akin to one from 0 "to A and her heirs so long as tobacco is
not used on the premises, and if tobacco is used on the premises to
B and her heirs.' Such language creates neither a fee simple de-
terminable nor a fee simple subject to condition subsequent, but
rather a fee simple subject to executory limitation. Upon a breach
of the restriction, A's interest terminates automatically and the
property is forfeited directly to B.22 This automatic-forfeiture fea-
ture makes a fee simple subject to executory limitation analogous
to a fee simple determinable;" the catalogue of defeasible fees con-
17. For a more detailed analysis of the events discussed in this section, see Jonathan L.
Entin, The Shifting Color Line in Prince Edward County, paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Law and Society Association (May 28-31, 1992) (on file with author).
18. Hermitage Methodist Homes of Va., Inc. v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 741
(Va.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 907 (1990).
19. Id. at 742.
20. Another difference between this conveyance and the hypothetical defeasible fees de-
scribed above is that the conveyance involved a sum of money to be held in trust rather
than a legal interest in land. This difference does not affect the present discussion.
21. The future interest in this example ordinarily would violate the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities because the no-tobacco restriction might be breached more than 21 years after the
end of all lives in being at the creation of the interest. See, e.g., Proprietors of the Church v.
Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 142, 152-53 (1855). The Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply
to the situation in Hermitage Methodist Homes, however, because all of the relevant inter-
ests were held by charitable organizations. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 397(1) (1944).
22. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 46 (1936).
23. The analogy is imperfect in other respects, however. For example, the Rule Against
Perpetuities applies to executory interests in fees simple subject to executory limitation but
not to possibilities of reverter in fees simple determinable (or, for that matter, to powers of
termination in fees simple subject to condition subsequent). RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§
370 & cmt. e, 372 (1944). The Rule did not apply to the executory interest in Hermitage
Methodist Homes, however. See supra note 21.
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tains no counterpart to a fee simple subject to condition subse-
quent under which a third party must invoke something like a
power of termination upon the breach of a restriction.14
The background to the creation of the Adams trust resonates
deeply in modern American history The Prince Edward School
Foundation was founded in June 1955 to establish private schools
for white pupils in the event that the federal courts ordered the
public schools of Prince Edward County to desegregate. Such an
order seemed certain because the county school board was one of
the defendants in Brown v. Board of Education.25 The order finally
came in 1959.26 Local officials responded by shutting down the
public schools. At the same time, the Foundation opened a private
school known as Prince Edward Academy that enrolled almost
every white student in the county 27 The Academy continued to
enroll a large majority of the county's white pupils for some years
after the Supreme Court ordered the public schools reopened on a
desegregated basis in 1964.28
The Foundation adhered to a whites-only admissions policy for
almost thirty years despite two important legal setbacks.29 The
more serious of these was the loss of its federal tax exemption
24. A power of termination may exist only in the grantor or his successor in interest.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 24 cmt. d (1936). One commentator has suggested that a court
might uphold an interest in a third party analogous to a power of termination but cited no
example in which this had occurred. Paul G. Haskell, Contractual Devices to Keep "Un-
desirables" out of the Neighborhood, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 524, 528 (1969). More recently, a
Massachusetts court interpreted a statute as allowing the creation of such an interest in a
third party, but the court made clear that the existence of the statute was essential to its
ruling. Oak's Oil Serv., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 447 N.E.2d 27, 30-31
(Mass. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 451 N.E.2d 1166 (Mass. 1983).
25. 347 U.S. 483, 483 n.*, 486, 487 n.1 (1954), rev'g Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 103 F Supp.
337 (E.D. Va. 1952) (three-judge court). On the background leading to the filing of the
Prince Edward case, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 451-507 (1976); BOB SMITH, THEY
CLOSED THEIR SCHOOLS 3-79 (1965). On the origins of the Foundation, see BENJAMIN MUSE,
VIRGINIA'S MASSIVE RESISTANCE 11-15, 58-62 (1961); SMITH, supra, at 87-125.
26. Allen v. County Sch. Bd., 266 F.2d 507 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
830 (1959).
27. SMITH, supra note 25, at 167; RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN 95 (1984).
28. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). For accounts of events during the
school closing, see SMITH, supra note 25, at 151-259; WOLTERS, supra note 27, at 94-114.
29. A handful of children of Asian origin enrolled at the Academy at various times. This
fact was not mentioned in the Hermitage Methodist Homes litigation. See infra notes 112-
17 and accompanying text.
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in 1978 under an Internal Revenue Service ruling that denied
favorable tax status to racially discriminatory private schools.30
The federal courts upheld the revocation after protracted litiga-
tion.31 Several years later, when enrollment at the Academy had
fallen to half its earlier high levels and most white pupils were at-
tending public schools, the Foundation sought to regain its tax ex-
emption. In the fall of 1986, soon after the exemption was restored,
Prince Edward Academy enrolled five African-American stu-
dents.32
The bank administering the Adams trust thereupon filed an ac-
tion in state court seeking guidance as to which party was entitled
to receive the trust income. By then, the three educational institu-
tions that had received gifts over also had violated the racial re-
30. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, 231. The other legal setback came in a case which
held that a Reconstruction statute prohibiting racial discrimination in the making and en-
forcement of contracts, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (amended 1991), applied to admissions poli-
cies of private schools. The Foundation was legally bound by this ruling because an associa-
tion to which it belonged intervened in the litigation. See Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster Sch.,
Inc., 363 F Supp. 1200, 1204 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), aff'd, 427
U.S. 160 (1976).
This decision had little immediate impact on the Foundation because, as its legal counsel
explained, no blacks had ever applied to the Academy, and none would do so for a decade
thereafter. Recent Developments Regarding the Tax-Exempt Status of Certain Private
Schools: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1986) (testimony of John William Crews, Esq.) [hereinafter
1986 Hearing]; Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1985) (testi-
mony of John William Crews, Esq.) [hereinafter 1985 Hearing].
31. See Prince Edward Sch. Found. v. Commissioner, 478 F Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1979),
aff'd mem., No. 79-1622 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 944 (1981). The
policy of denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools, see Rev. RuL
71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587, was subsequently upheld by the
Supreme Court. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
32. Sandra Evans, Era Ends at Once-Segregated Va. School; Prince Edward Academy
Admits Blacks, but Some Question Motibes, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1986, at Al. The Founda-
tion's tax exemption was initially restored in August 1985 after the board of directors an-
nounced for the first time that the Academy had a nondiscriminatory admission policy. The
restoration of the school's tax exemption provoked widespread criticism and led the IRS to
reconsider its decision. See, e.g., 1985 Hearing, supra note 30. The IRS finally restored the
exemption after the Foundation added a black member to its board of directors and estab-
lished a small fund for minority scholarships. That decision also generated controversy. See,
e.g., 1986 Hearing, supra note 30, at 34-35.
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striction.33 The trial court voided the restriction as unconstitu-
tional and held that the Foundation should continue to receive the
income from the trust.3 4 The state supreme court reversed, ruling
that the trust should be enforced as written and that the nursing
home, which had never been subject to the restriction, was now the
proper beneficiary 5
The Virginia Supreme Court finessed the constitutional issue,
concluding that the nursing home should prevail regardless of the
validity of the whites-only provision. The opinion instead focused
upon the semantic distinction between limitations and conditions.
The language of the racial restriction included the words "[s]o long
as," classic indicators of a limitation.3 6 Assuming that the limi-
tation was constitutional, all of the educational institutions had
forfeited their rights by admitting blacks, so the nursing home
was entitled to the income by the express terms of the trust.3 7 Con-
versely, if the limitation were unconstitutional, the court could not
excise part of the Foundation's interest-the racial restric-
tion-but would have to strike all of it. The same reasoning ap-
plied to the other educational institutions, leaving the nursing
home as the sole eligible beneficiary 38
Although the Virginia Supreme Court had previously down-
played the significance of the limitation-condition distinction," the
opinion in Hermitage Methodist Homes made clear that classify-
ing the racial restriction as a limitation was crucial to the outcome.
Under this approach, a limitation is integral to the estate con-
veyed, whereas a condition is not. If a limitation fails, so must the
rest of the estate. On the other hand, if a condition subsequent
33. Hermitage Methodist Homes of Va., Inc. v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 742
(Va.), cert. dented, 498 U.S. 907 (1990).
34. Id. at 743.
35. Id. at 747.
36. Id. at 745. This is, of course, the traditional view. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 44 cmt. I & illus. 17 (1936).
37. Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 746. This analysis presumes that racial
restrictions are legally problematic only if they are unconstitutional. There were, however,
other grounds for attacking the restriction. See infra Part IV
38. Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 746.
39. Sanford v. Sims, 66 S.E.2d 495, 497 (Va. 1951) ("Technically, perhaps, there is a dis-
tinction between a possibility of reverter and a [power of termination] for breach of a condi-
tion subsequent; but the distinction is usually not observed and possibility of reverter and
[power of termination] are treated as the same.").
[Vol. 34:769
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fails, the rest of the estate survives. Very different conclusions fol-
low from these premises if the racial restriction fails. Because the
restriction m the Adams trust was a limitation, all of the provi-
sions relating to the educational institutions had to be removed;
only the nursing home's unencumbered interest remained intact.
By contrast, had the whites-only provision appeared in a condition
subsequent, the Foundation's beneficial interest in the trust could
have been saved by simply excising the offending language.4 °
In support of this conclusion, the court relied upon a gloss on
dictum m Meek v. Fox,41 an obscure case that might have misclas-
sified a limitation as a condition and, in any event, had made vir-
tually no previous impact.2 Meek does not mention the blanket
rule for which it was cited, nor does American law more generally
endorse that approach.4" Even if there were more direct prece-
40. Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 745-46.
41. 88 S.E. 161, 162-63 (Va. 1916).
42. Meek involved the validity of a restraint on marriage. The court held that the re-
straint was embodied in an illegal condition subsequent and struck the restriction, leaving
the grantee with an interest in fee simple absolute. Id. at 164. It is not clear that the court
correctly classified the restraint, however. The conveyance was "to my daughter forever,
except she should marry, then at her death I desire that it shall revert to her legal heirs."
Id. at 161 (emphasis added). The future interest, which was m the grantee's heirs rather
than the grantor's, might have been seen as an executory interest instead of a condition
subsequent. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 24 (1936).
Apart from that problem, Meek had never been cited as authority for the rule that the
Hermitage Methodist Homes court applied. The only previous Virginia citation came in a
trial court decision relating to the time of .vesting of future interests. United Va. Bank v.
Baldwin, 7 Va. Cir. Ct. 471, 472 (Richmond Cir. Ct. 1977). One out-of-state court cited
Meek on the same question. Sorrels v. McNally, 105 So. 106, 110 (Fla. 1925). Another out-
of-state court included it in a string citation that simply listed cases involving restraints on
marriage. Baker v. Hickman, 273 P 480, 482 (Kan. 1929).
Meek had also been cited in a few.secondary sources, but none of those sources treated it
as authority for the proposition that an illegal special limitation invalidates the estate to
which it applies. See, e.g., 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 9, § 27.12, at 647 n.27;
3 LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1514, at 399 n.7, 402
n.14 (2d ed. 1956); Annotation, Conditions, Conditional Limitations, or Contracts in Re-
straint of Marriage, 122 A-L.R. 7, 23 n.1, 64 n.5, 95 n.8 (1939).
43. Some commentators have suggested that, in cases involving devises, English law takes
the approach adopted in Hermitage Methodist Homes. See, e.g., ROBERT MEGARRY &
H.W.R. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 73-74 (5th ed. 1984); Andrew Lyall, Human
Rights and Conditional and Determinable Interests in Freeholds, 22 IRISH JURIST (n.s.)
250, 263, 266 (1987). It is not clear that any English case expressly so holds, however. Olin
L. Browder, Jr., Illegal Conditions and Limitations: Effect of Illegality, 47 MICH. L. REV.
759, 761 (1949). One American state followed this approach for a time, see id. at 762 n.13,
but has since repudiated it. In re Estate of Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d 29, 34 (IMI. 1975).
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dents, the court's purely semantic methodology was unsound.
Commentators have almost universally condemned the limitation-
condition distinction and advocated similar treatment for all un-
lawful restrictions." The grantor's intent should determine
whether illegality defeats the entire conveyance or only the unlaw-
ful restriction, whether the restriction is embodied in a limitation
or in a condition.45
To be sure, there is authority for treating unlawful restrictions embodied in conditions
subsequent differently from those embodied in special limitations. That authority does not,
however, support the blanket rule adopted in Hermitage Methodist Homes. Instead, it sug-
gests that illegal conditions subsequent be excised, leaving the rest of the conveyance intact;
invalid limitations or conditions precedent could result in excising either the offending re-
striction or the entire conveyance, depending upon the grantor's intent. See, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 65 & cmts. e-f (1959); 4 GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 211, at 130-32 (3d ed. 1990); 1A AUSTIN W.
SCOTT & WILLIAM F FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 65, § 65.2, at 379, § 65.3, at 382 (4th
ed. 1989).
There also is authority for the view that unlawful restrictions, whether embodied in limi-
tations or conditions subsequent, should be stricken. That would leave the grantee with an
unfettered interest. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY DONATiVE TRANSFERS §§
6.1(1), .2 (1983); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 424 cmt. d (1944). Of course, this approach
also is inconsistent with the one taken by the Virginia Supreme Court in Hermitage Meth-
odist Homes.
44. See, e.g., 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 9, § 27.14, at 652 ("purely for-
mal"); 3 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 42, § 1514, at 402 ("utterly Irrational"); 1 HERBERT T.
TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 197, at 326-27 (Basil Jones ed., 3d ed. 1939) ("by no
means satisfactory").
45. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 9, § 27.23; Browder, supra note 43, at
765-67; Dunham, supra note 12, at 223. Other commentators who have advocated the aboli-
tion of the distinction between fees simple determinable and fees simple subject to condi-
tion subsequent have not addressed the consequences of finding a restriction unlawful. See
supra note 15. Nothing in their discussion suggests that they would preserve the limitation-
condition distinction for this purpose when they would abandon it for all others, however.
The grantor's intent is not the only possible basis for deciding how to remedy an unlawful
restriction, of course. Courts could follow either of two alternative uniform rules: 1) invali-
date the entire conveyance, or 2) strike only the unlawful restriction. Both of these uniform
rules are undesirable because they conflict with the cardinal principle of property law that
seeks to interpret conveyances so as to uphold the intent of the grantor. See, e.g., Motes/
Henes Trust v. Motes, 761 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Ark. 1988); Willard v. First Church of Christ,
Scientist, 498 P.2d 987, 989 (Cal. 1972); Bibo v. Bibo, 74 N.E.2d 808, 810 (Ill. 1947); Clark v.
Strother, 385 S.E.2d 578, 581 (Va. 1989); Chesapeake Corp. v. McCreery, 216 S.E.2d 22, 25
(Va. 1975); First Nat'l Exchange Bank v. Seaboard Citizens Nat'l Bank, 107 S.E.2d 408, 411
(Va. 1959); cf. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 228-229 (1936) (stating that the validity of
remaining interests upon failure of prior or subsequent interest should be assessed in terms
of the grantor's intent).
The argument against an across-the-board rule that ignores the grantor's intent receives
analogical support from judicial practice in cases involving unconstitutional legislation.
778
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We cannot be certain how a long-dead testator would have re-
vised her will had she known that courts would invalidate one of
its terms. The best indicator of the grantor's intent is the language
of the conveyance. The structure of the Adams trust strongly sug-
gests that the whites-only provision was meant to be inextricably
intertwined with the Foundation's interest. Not only that interest
but also the gifts over to the other three educational institutions
were subject to this restriction; only the gift over to the nursing
home made no reference to race.46 These features show the obdu-
racy of the grantor's commitment to segregated schooling and his
complete unwillingness to subsidize racial mixing in the classroom.
The circumstances surrounding the conveyance ought to dispel
any doubt about the centrality of the whites-only provision to the
Foundation's interest. The Adams trust was part of a will that was
originally drafted in 1956 and revised in 1964.41 During this period,
there was no more salient political issue in Virginia than school
desegregation. The state pursued a campaign of Massive Resis-
tance to Brown for several years beginning in 1955."1 Even after
When addressing that problem, the Supreme Court has avoided the kind of mechanical ap-
proach that would, in this context, either invalidate every infected conveyance or always
strike out only the unlawful restriction. For example, the Court has held that impermissibly
underinclusive statutes may be either invalidated in their entirety or interpreted so as to
confer benefits on the class that had been excluded. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S.
728, 740 (1984); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17-18 (1975); Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 361-65 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank
v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931). See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts
on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301,
316-24 (1979). Similarly, when dealing with a partially unconstitutional statute, the Court
must decide whether the offending provision is severable from the whole measure. It does so
by seeking to determine if the rest of the bill would have passed had the legislature known
that it could not enact the unconstitutional provision. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-87 (1987); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931-32 (1983); Champlin
Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
Reliance upon one of these uniform rules might be appropriate when the grantor's intent
is undiscoverable. This notion is similar to the use of rules of construction that disfavor
partial intestacy or permit resort to the doctrine of cy pres to prevent a trust from failing.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399. None of these problems was presented in
Hermitage Methodist Homes, however.
46. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
47. Hermitage Methodist Homes of Va., Inc. v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 741
(Va.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 907 (1990).
48. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA. THE BYRD ORGANIZA-
TION AND THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 30-89 (1976); MUSE, supra note 25, at 15-139.
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Massive Resistance collapsed at the state level, Prince Edward
County closed its public schools for five years to avoid desegrega-
tion.49 It is inconceivable that the testator, who resided near Prince
Edward,50 was unaware of these events.5 1 In short, the historical
background to the conveyance lends credence to the view that the
meticulously crafted racial restriction was intended as an essential
ingredient of the interests conveyed to the Foundation and the
other educational institutions. Regardless of the label attached to
the whites-only provision, therefore, the invalidity of the restric-
tion should have defeated the entire gift to the educational
institutions.
All of this assumes that the limitation in the Adams trust was
indeed unconstitutional, a question that the state supreme court
scrupulously avoided. This avoidance strategy may have been de-
fensible in traditional jurisprudential terms, 52 but it would have
been unavailable had the trust been written somewhat differently
Suppose, for example, that the trust contained no gift over to the
nursing home. This alternative scenario is not entirely speculative,
because conveyances of defeasible fees containing racial restric-
tions became relatively common by the beginning of the twentieth
century "
In this scenario, the reversionary interest, held by the grantor or
his successors, might be either a possibility of reverter or a power
of termination. The reversionary interest in Hermitage Methodist
Homes was held by a third party and so could only have been an
executory interest.54 In our hypothetical example, by contrast, the
limitation-condition distinction could be dispositive. If the ar-
rangement were a fee simple determinable, the court could equivo-
49. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
50. Adams resided in Lynchburg, which is approximately 50 miles from the Academy.
Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 741.
51. Cf. Tinnin v. First United Bank, 502 So. 2d 659, 668 (Miss. 1987) (finding it "difficult
to hold" that a whites-only restriction in an educational trust was "idly inserted" in light of
widely publicized "racial turbulence" over recent desegregation of the University of Missis-
sippi when the will creating the trust was written).
52. The standard citation for this proposition is Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
53. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Defeasible Fee and the Birth of the Modern Residential
Subdivision, 49 Mo. L. REv. 695, 724 (1984).
54. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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cate on the constitutionality of the special limitation just as it fi-
nessed the constitutionality of the executory limitation. On the-
other hand, if the arrangement were a fee simple subject to condi-
tion subsequent, the court would have to rule on the validity of the
condition in order to decide whether the Foundation would retain
its interest free of the racial restriction or forfeit its interest be-
cause of the breach. The next section therefore considers the con-
stitutional question.
III. DEFEASIBLE FEES AND THE CONSTITUTION
Until recently, most private racial restrictions on the possession
or use of property were regarded as legally unproblematic. 5 5 For
that reason, few cases specifically address the state-action issue in
the defeasible-fee context. The cases that bear on the question sug-
gest that limitations embodying racial restrictions do not implicate
the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the same restrictions con-
tained in conditions subsequent can run afoul of the Constitution.
This tentative conclusion has unfortunate implications that will be
explored below.
A. Special Limitations
The constitutionality of race-based special limitations was ex-
amined most fully in Charlotte Park & Recreation Commission v.
55. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1926) (finding no constitutional
violation in privately created restrictive covenants); 2 LEWIS M. SIMES, THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS § 460, at 302-03 (1936) (discussing cases upholding racial restrictions on occu-
pancy or use). One indication of the traditional view is that, until 1950, the code of ethics of
the organization now known as the National Association of Realtors provided that "[a]
Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood members of
any race or nationality whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in
that neighborhood." RosE HELPER, RACIAL PRACTICES AND POLICIS OF REAL ESTATE BRO-
KERS 201 (1969); see LuIGI LAURENTI, PROPERTY VALUES AND RACE 17 (1960).
Although private racial restrictions were generally accepted, at least some governmental
ones were not. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (invalidating a race-based
occupancy ordinance). Nevertheless, federal policies played an important role in promoting
housing segregation until well after World War II. See, e.g., CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN
NEIGHBORS 227-43 (1955); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 197-203, 208-15
(1985); Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Elizabeth Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American
Dream: Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 Nw.
U. L. REv. 491, 511-15 (1979).
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Barringer 16 The owners of three contiguous parcels conveyed their
land to a municipality for use as a whites-only park; the deeds pro-
vided for forfeiture should the racial restriction be breached." The
state courts had no difficulty in finding that the deeds gave the city
fee simple determinable in the land. 8 Because the forfeiture would
occur instantaneously when nonwhites used the park, the fee
would terminate by operation of law The state itself would not be
directly involved, so the governmental action required to trigger
the Fourteenth Amendment was missing.5 9
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Evans v.
Abney, 0 which arose in a slightly different context. The issue there
56. 88 S.E.2d 114 (N.C. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
57. Id. at 117.
58. Id. at 122-23. It is not entirely clear that one of the deeds conveyed a determinable
fee. That deed required, as a "condition precedent to the reversion of [this] land" if non-
whites were permitted to use the park, that the grantor or his successors in interest pay the
city a fixed sum of money. Id. at 117. The requirement of prior payment suggested that this
parcel would not automatically return to the grantor upon a violation of the racial restric-
tion. Automatic forfeiture is the hallmark of determinable fees. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §
44(b) (1936). At the same time, a restriction can be a special limitation even if one of its
elements involves "an exercise of the volition of the conveyor." Id. § 44 cmt. h. The resolu-
tion of this question does not affect the analysis that follows.
59. Barringer, 88 S.E.2d at 123. Even if this general principle applies to determinable
fees, it is not clear that Barnnger was correctly decided. An exception to the principle exists
when the government is pervasively intertwined with a private actor. Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). In Barringer, a municipal body was the grantee of
land that was subject to a whites-only special limitation. That municipal body maintained a
park and golf course on the property and strictly enforced the racial restriction. Barringer,
88 S.E.2d at 117-18. This represented even greater governmental involvement than occurred
in Burton, where state action was found on the basis of a municipal agency's lease of restau-
rant space to a private operator who practiced discrimination. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. The
continuing vitality of the Burton exception is uncertain. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 n.29 (1987); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982).
Whether or not a forfeiture for violation of the special limitation in Barringer implicated
state action, however, it was clear the city could not constitutionally operate the park and
golf course on a segregated basis. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (parks); New Orle-
ans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (same); Gayle
v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S.
879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)
(per curiam) (beaches). The dispute over the park in Barringer was ultimately resolved
when the city acquired the possibility of reverter from the grantors and a state court or-
dered the admission of blacks to the park. Elias Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 992 n.48 (1957).
60. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
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concerned the validity of a racial restriction on land conveyed in
trust for use as a municipal park.' When continued operation of
the park on a segregated basis became impossible, 2 the state court
ruled that the trust had failed and that the land had automatically
reverted to the grantor's heirs. The Supreme Court found no viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. The return of the property
had occurred according to racially neutral principles of state trust
law. Whatever racial prejudice led to the forfeiture decision re-
flected the views of private parties, not the government, and there-
fore was constitutionally unobjectionable. e
This reasoning does not sweep as broadly as that in Barringer
The Evans decision nonetheless implies that an automatic forfei-
ture for breach of a racial restriction in a fee simple determinable
will not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. Taken together,
these cases suggest that a special limitation relating to race is
probably constitutional even though it is morally repugnant.
B. Conditions Subsequent
The validity of racially restrictive conditions subsequent is much
more problematic. Although there appears to be no case directly on
point,6" the Supreme Court's treatment of restrictive covenants
sheds important light on the issue. In Shelley v. Kraemer,6 5 the
Court held that a purely private restriction was constitutionally
valid because it involved no governmental action e. 6 At the same
time, any judicial enforcement by way of injunction would re-
present state action and hence would violate the Fourteenth
61. The conveyance did not use defeasible-fee language and made no provision for what
would happen if the whites-only provision were breached. Id. at 443 n.2.
62. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
63. Abney, 396 U.S. at 444-45.
64. Despite the traditional judicial tolerance of formally private racial restrictions on oc-
cupancy or use, see supra note 55, one court refused to enforce a whites-only condition
subsequent under the theory of changed conditions. Letteau v. Ellis, 10 P.2d 496, 497 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1932); cf. Meade v. Dennistone, 196 A. 330, 335-36 (Md. 1938) (suggesting
that a racially restrictive covenant can expire due to changed conditions); Pickel v.
McCawley, 44 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Mo. 1931) (finding that a restrictive covenant had expired
due to changed conditions).
65. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
66. Id. at 13; accord Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323, 330-31 (1926).
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Amendment. 7 This reasoning was extended to damage awards in
Barrows v. Jackson.68
If judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants is uncon-
stitutional, judicial enforcement of similar restrictions embodied in
conditions subsequent is almost certainly improper. Although the
restrictions themselves might be permissible as purely private ar-
rangements, exercise of the power of termination typically requires
resort to litigation."9 If a court may not grant an injunction or
award damages for violation of a race-based restriction, it surely
may not order a forfeiture. Courts generally seek to avoid imposing
that drastic remedy for breach of obviously lawful conditions sub-
sequent.70 There is no reason to believe that they would be recep-
67. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14-21; accord Hurd, 334 U.S. at 31-34 (holding that federal court
enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant violated the Fifth Amendment).
68. 346 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1953).
69. Dunham, supra note 12, at 216. The high likelihood of litigation exists because the
holder of a power of termination need not actually enter onto the property to reclaim pos-
session following breach of a condition subsequent. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra
note 9, § 4.9, at 424; ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.5, at 101
(1984); Dunham, supra note 12, at 230.
Litigation is not the only means of exercising a power of termination, however. The power
may be asserted "by any appropriate manifestation of [the holder's] intent thereby to
terminate the interest in question." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 24 cmt. b, special note
(1936). It is not clear what constitutes an appropriate manifestation of intent, although the
traditional physical entry upon real property presumably would suffice. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 9, § 4.9, at 424. If a power of termination were exercised by way of an
actual entry, the fee on condition would terminate immediately upon the entry, just as the
determinable fee would terminate immediately upon the breach. Any subsequent quiet-title
action would merely declare the parties' rights that had arisen by operation of law, so there
would be no state action to trigger constitutional scrutiny of the restriction.
It bears emphasis that this scenario is exceedingly unlikely and that powers of termina-
tion typically are exercised through court action. This is so because the law provides power-
ful disincentives for the exercise of self-help to recover possession of property. For example,
many jurisdictions prohibit a landlord from engaging in self-help to recover possession from
a holdover tenant when speedy judicial remedies exist. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY:
LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.2 (1977). Even when such alternatives are not available, the land-
lord's self-help must be peaceable, which proscribes not only actual but also reasonably fore-
seeable breaches of the peace. Id. § 14.3. Similarly, in commercial law, which explicitly au-
thorizes self-help in some circumstances, a secured creditor "may proceed without judicial
process [only] if this can be done without breach of the peace." U.C.C. § 9-503 (1990). Again,
not only actual but threatened breaches of the peace are forbidden. See JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-6 (3d ed. 1988); Special Project, Self-
Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Prwileges and Remedies in Contemporary American Society,
37 VAND. L. REV. 845, 916-19 (1984).
70. See Korngold, supra note 15, at 549 & nn.84-90 (collecting cases).
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tive to forfeitures in situations where less draconian sanctions are
constitutionally unavailable. 7 1
C. Executory Limitations
Apparently no court has directly considered the constitutionality
of a racially restrictive executory limitation.72 Recall, though, that
a fee simple subject to executory limitation is functionally identical
to a fee simple determinable. The only difference is that the forfei-
ture is to a third party rather than to the grantor. There is no
analogue to the fee simple subject to condition subsequent for a
third party; breach of a whites-only restriction embodied in an ex-
ecutory limitation results in automatic forfeiture.73 Hence, it is
likely that courts would treat executory limitations the same way
they have treated special limitations.
In sum, the traditional semantic approach suggests the following
tentative conclusion: racial restrictions embodied in special or ex-
ecutory limitations probably are constitutional, whereas the same
restrictions expressed in conditions subsequent probably cannot be
enforced. This conclusion suggests that the court in Hermitage
Methodist Homes, had it addressed the issue squarely, would have
rejected the Prince Edward School Foundation's claim that up-
holding the whites-only provision in the Adams trust violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Upon further reflection, however, the
traditional approach is troublesome.
71. Cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969) (treating a race-
based refusal to permit the transfer of membership in a neighborhood recreation association
as "functionally comparable to a racially restrictive covenant").
72. The restriction in Capitol Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 316 P.2d 252 (Colo.
1957), was an executory limitation, but the court, without explanation, treated it as a cove-
nant. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
74. Perhaps in recognition of this problem, the Foundation made a different state-action
argument. It claimed that, when the trust was created, Virginia law required the inclusion of
the racial limitation. This legal requirement rendered the whites-only trust provision either
unenforceable or unconstitutional. Hermitage Methodist Homes of Va., Inc. v. Dominion
Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 744 (Va.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 907 (1990). This argument em-
phasized that the only basis for creating an educational trust in Virginia was a statute origi-
nally passed in 1839 which had been construed by the state courts as recognizing only those
educational trusts that provided for racially segregated schooling. Triplett v. Trotter, 193
S.E. 514, 516 (Va. 1937), cited in Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 742.
1993]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:769
D Another Look at State Action and the Limitation-Condition
Distinction
The difficulty with the traditional approach can be seen in two
ways. This section first reconsiders the substantive differences be-
tween the fee simple determinable and the fee simple subject to
condition subsequent, then compares those interests with the fee
simple subject to executory limitation. The next section urges that
all three estates be treated analogously
1. Determinable Fees and Fees on Condition
At one level, the notion that a fee simple determinable expires
without any governmental involvement is consistent with the Su-
preme Court's approach to the problem of state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Merely promulgating a rule that controls
the conduct of private parties generally does not represent state
action for constitutional purposes.75 Because a determinable fee
The Foundation's argument implies that state law rather than personal beliefs led the
grantor to include the restriction in the conveyance. The argument is unpersuasive. First,
the language creating the Adams trust and the circumstances surrounding its establishment
strongly suggest that the grantor included the whites-only provision out of personal convic-
tion. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. Moreover, state law did not demand
that the document creating an educational trust include an express provision for racially
separate instruction. In fact, the instrument establishing the trust at issue in the case that
construed the Virginia educational-trust statute as requiring segregation did not include
such a provision, but the court upheld the trust anyway. Triplett, 193 S.E. at 515-16. In
other words, this was not a situation in which a reluctant testator was forced to include an
objectionable clause by virtue of a state law. Instead, the restriction seems to reflect the
testator's own social philosophy. There is no plausible evidence that he was "persuaded or
induced to include racial restrictions by the fact that such restrictions were permitted by
[Virginia's] trust statutes." Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970).
75. E.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978) (holding that governmen-
tal acquiescence in a private party's statutorily authorized sale of entrusted goods did not
constitute state action); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 354-59 (1974)
(concluding that a private utility company operating under a government-awarded monop-
oly was not a state actor and therefore was not required to afford procedural due process to
customers); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-77 (1972) (finding that a liquor
license awarded to a private club did not make the club's racial discrimination a form of
state action).
This idea has not gone unchallenged. See, e.g., Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal The-
ory: A Casenote on Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1310-22 (1982); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 520-27 (1985); Harold W
Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
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expires automatically upon the breach of a special limitation, no
state action is involved when forfeiture occurs.
At another level, however, this notion is unrealistic. In a fee sim-
ple determinable, the government does more than just provide gen-
eral rules to structure a private relationship. The parties to a de-
terminable fee are likely to resort to litigation to resolve whether a
restriction has been breached and whether a forfeiture has oc-
curred.7 6 Courts therefore must decide whether the conveyance in
question was a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to
condition subsequent. In many instances, courts confuse the two
estates, thereby creating powerful incentives for parties to litigate
in every dispute over a defeasible fee." The distinction between
judicial confirmation that forfeiture had occurred automatically
and judicial enforcement of powers of termination is too fragile to
support different constitutional conclusions.7 8 No matter what la-
bels are used, the dynamics of the situation are essentially the
same, and the law should reflect that reality
2. Fees on Executory Limitation
If the substantive differences between special limitations and
conditions subsequent are evanescent, they disappear completely
with executory limitations. No matter what language a grantor
uses to create a restriction, automatic forfeiture to a third party
will result upon a breach. As noted earlier, there is no analogue to
a power of termination when a third party, rather than the grantor,
holds the future interest in a defeasible fee. 79 The traditional doc-
30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957). Resolving that controversy is not essential to the present
discussion.
76. Dunham, supra note 12, at 216.
77. Id. at 216-17 & n.5 (collecting cases); Korngold, supra note 15, at 538 & nn.29-30
(collecting more recent cases). Another factor encouraging litigation is that many persons
involved in creating defeasible estates do not appreciate the technical differences between
determinable fees and fees on condition subsequent. Olin L. Browder, Jr., Defeasible Fee
Estates in Oklahoma: The Civic Center Cases, 4 OKLA. L. REV. 141, 153 (1951).
78. Viewed realistically, the idea that these situations are different in any important sense
rests on a legal fiction that is "so preposterous that only small children believ[e] it and only
constitutional lawyers debat[e] it." EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN
THE SOUTH 84 (1987) (discussing the notion that there was no state action in white
primaries).
79. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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trine therefore assures the absence of state action whenever a gran-
tor has the foresight to provide for a forfeiture to someone other
than himself. A rule of law that can be so easily evaded by artful
drafting has little to commend it.80
E. Toward a Unified Law of Defeasible Fees
The preceding discussion suggests that the form of the restric-
tion should not control its constitutionality One example of judi-
cial refusal to be bound by purely semantic considerations is Capi-
tol Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Smith,"' which concerned an
agreement that committed the signatories and their successors in
interest not to sell or otherwise allow their property to be occupied
by nonwhites."2 Violation would result in forfeiture to those other
signatories (or their successors) who recorded a notice of claim; the
agreement also authorized damages and injunctive relief. When
blacks purchased several lots that were subject to this restriction, a
group of whites claimed to have gained title under the forfeiture
clause.83
The principal issue in the case was the proper characterization
of the agreement. The defendants sought to avoid constitutional
difficulties by claiming that the automatic forfeiture provision
made the restriction an executory limitation that gave them title to
the disputed lots by operation of law 84 The court rejected this
technical argument and held that the arrangement was, in sub-
stance if not in form, a racial restriction that was unenforceable
under the logic of Shelley and Barrows."5
Capitol Federal is not a strong precedent for those who advocate
a unified law of defeasible fees. First, the opinion was inadequately
reasoned, resting upon little more than disdain for the arcana of
80. Other rules of law that lend themselves to evasion through clever draftsmanship have
been abandoned. A notable example is the Rule in Shelley's Case. BERGIN & HASKELL, supra
note 9, at 98; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIvE TRANSFERS § 30.1(3) &
statutory note (1983).
81. 316 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1957).
82. Id. at 253.
83. Id. at 254.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 255; see supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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traditional property doctrine.8 6 Second, it is clear that this ruling
was not intended to consolidate the law of defeasible fees. Colo-
rado courts have never cited this case, and they continue to treat
the limitation-condition distinction as dispositive in some cir-
cumstances.87
Nevertheless, the court's refusal to allow labels to control analy-
sis has much to commend it. Functionally equivalent private con-
trols on property should receive substantively analogous judicial
treatment.88 If courts may not issue injunctions or award damages
for violations of racial restrictions, they should not be permitted to
86. The court explained its conclusion in the following language:
No matter by what ariose terms the covenant under consideration may be clas-
sified by astute counsel, it is still a racial restriction in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. High sounding phrases or
outmoded common law terms cannot alter the effect of the agreement em-
braced in the instant case. While the hands may seem to be the hands of Esau
to a blind Isaac, the voice is definitely Jacob's. We cannot give our judicial
approval or blessing to a contract such as is here involved.
Capitol Federal, 316 P.2d at 255.
The court's dismissal of "outmoded common law terms" blinded it to an alternative basis
for decision that could have rendered the forfeiture clause void, not merely unenforceable.
The defendants were correct that the clause involved an executory limitation rather than a
covenant because violation of the restriction would result in forfeiture, not damages or in-
junctive relief, and the forfeiture would be to someone other than the conveyor. RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY §§ 25, 46 (1936). That fact was less important than the defendants be-
lieved. Executory interests are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. See supra note 23.
The agreement was to be effective between 1942 and 1990. Capitol Federal, 316 P.2d at 254.
It was thus possible for the executory interest to vest outside the perpetuities period. There-
fore, that interest was void from the outset and should have been stricken. This reasoning
alone would not have eliminated the racial restriction, because striking an executory interest
under the Rule Against Perpetuities does not necessarily void the forfeiture provision. The
court then must determine what the parties would have done had they known that their
original agreement was partially invalid. Ordinarily, the forfeiture provision survives; the
future interest is left in the grantor (as a possibility of reverter or power of termination,
depending upon the precise language of the conveyance) after the defective executory limi-
tation is removed. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 228 cmt. b, illus. 2 (1936); see, e.g., City of
Klamath Falls v. Bell, 490 P.2d 515, 517-19 (Or. Ct. App. 1971). This situation is different,
however. Excising the executory interest would mean that any property conveyed to a non-
white would be forfeited to the conveyor. It is unlikely that any owner would have agreed to
such an arrangement. (A developer might have done so, but no developer was involved in
this arrangement.) Accordingly, the court could have stricken the racial restriction alto-
gether using traditional common law principles. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 402 (1944).
87. See, e.g., School Dist. No. Six v. Russell, 396 P.2d 929, 930-32 (Colo. 1964); Nielsen v.
Woods, 687 P.2d 486, 488-89 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
88. Korngold, supra note 15, at 536-39, 559-61, 564-75.
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order the even more drastic remedy of forfeiture. More important,
the validity of a judicial ruling enforcing a forfeiture should not
turn upon evanescent conceptual distinctions arising from the use
of essentially equivalent words that have no real consequences for
the behavior of the parties. A restriction should not be insulated
from constitutional challenge simply because it is denominated a
limitation rather than a condition subsequent when a judicial or-
der will probably be required to effect the forfeiture in any event.
If the limitation-condition distinction were abolished, questions
would remain about the features of the generic defeasible fee. That
estate should be patterned after the fee simple subject to condition
subsequent. Under this model, the holder of the future inter-
est-whether the grantor or a third party-would have to take
some direct action to effect forfeiture upon breach of a restriction;
property would not be automatically forfeited. At the same time,
the fee simple determinable and the fee simple subject to execu-
tory limitation would be eliminated.89
This choice reflects the traditional constructional preference for
the fee on condition over the determinable fee.90 That preference
rests upon the law's special distaste for forfeiture, which, as a po-
tentially draconian remedy for comparatively minor breaches, may
well discourage productive use of property 91 Forfeiture is less
likely to occur with a fee simple subject to condition subsequent
than with a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to ex-
89. This recommendation goes beyond current law in almost every American jurisdiction,
but it builds upon efforts in the only two states that have passed legislation to unify the law
of defeasible fees. Both measures significantly reduce opportunities for automatic forfeiture.
They originally applied only to determinable fees and fees on condition, transforming pos-
sibilities of reverter into powers of termination. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 885.010, .020 (West Supp.
1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.218 (Baldwin 1988). A recent amendment in California also
converts executory interests into powers of termination held by third parties, thereby elimi-
nating all automatic forfeitures except in mineral leases. CAL. CIv. CODE § 885.015; see Mon-
tana-Fresno Oil Co. v. Powell, 33 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (noting special
rules of construction that traditionally have applied to oil and gas leases). See generally
Dunham, supra note 12, at 228-29.
90. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 45 cmt. m (1936); see, e.g., McDougall v. Palo Alto Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., 28 Cal. Rptr. 37, 46 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); D'Addario v. D'Addario, 603 A.2d
1199, 1202 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992); Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 139 A.2d 291, 297 (N.J.
1958).
91. Jost, supra note 53, at 736; Korngold, supra note 15, at 551-52; see also 1 SIMES &
SMITH, supra note 42, § 258, at 310.
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ecutory limitation because a power of termination must be affirma-
tively asserted; there can be no automatic forfeiture with a fee on
condition.9
2
One possible objection to this approach is that it would subject
all property restrictions to constitutional scrutiny under the state-
action doctrine. Federal law would put in jeopardy numerous ar-
rangements heretofore regarded as entirely private. More specific
to the racial context, measures designed to benefit rather than ex-
clude blacks might be thwarted because judicial enforcement
would cause these measures to run afoul of equal protection
standards."3
This concern is legitimate, but it should not be exaggerated. A
finding of state action does not lead ineluctably to a conclusion of
unconstitutionality 4 Many restrictions promote a sufficiently
powerful countervailing interest or impose such modest limits that
they can survive legal challenge. For example, the no-tobacco pro-
vision discussed in Part I probably can survive any constitutional
attack. So, too, might some restrictions on marriage. Although the
right to marry has been characterized as fundamental, 5 the Su-
preme Court has made clear that restrictions that "do not signifi-
cantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relation-
ship" will pass muster.9 6 That criterion strongly resembles the
traditional common law standard for assessing restraints against
92. See supra notes 11, 69 and accompanying text.
93. See Clark, supra note 59, at 1001. The concern is particularly acute in the context of
trusts, which are authorized and pervasively regulated by government. Id. at 1003-08; cf. In
re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1233-34 (N.Y. 1983) (emphasizing concern that a
finding of state action in a males-only educational trust would necessarily invalidate pro-
grams to assist females).
94. See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 72 (1955); Clark,
supra note 59, at 1013-14. See generally Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State
Action and the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75
CORNELL L. RE V. 1053, 1063-93 (1990).
95. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
96. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386; accord Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. Thus, formal marriage-
solemnization procedures have been upheld. Nelson v. Minner, 604 F Supp. 590 (S.D. Iowa
1985), aff'd, 786 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1986). So have consent requirements for some teenage
marriages. Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd per curiam, 669 F.2d 67
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982).
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marriage, which disfavors absolute prohibitions but upholds more
reasonable limits.97
On the other hand, the type of whites-only restriction at issue in
Hermitage Methodist Homes almost certainly would be rejected.
At the same time, not every racial distinction will fail the constitu-
tional test. Some arrangements that favor minorities have been
approved." Similar standards presumably would apply to race-
related provisions embodied in defeasible fees. To the extent that
this approach might create doctrinal untidiness and public uncer-
tainty, the problem arises not from the triggering presence of state
action but rather from the more general difficulty of defining the
legal significance of race. 9 Unifying the law of defeasible fees as
recommended here would focus attention upon the substantive
questions raised by property restrictions rather than upon artificial
conceptual distinctions that enable decisionmakers to avoid ad-
dressing the real issues raised by those restrictions.
IV BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION
The limitation-condition distinction remains largely intact, how-
ever. It is therefore curious that the challenge to the whites-only
restriction in the Adams trust rested exclusively upon constitu-
tional grounds. At least two alternative contentions, one statutory
and the other common law, were also available. These arguments
might not have changed the outcome. Indeed, this section suggests
that they should not have done so. Nevertheless, there was enough
authority supporting these nonconstitutional arguments that they
must be regarded as worthy of serious consideration.
97. For example, absolute restraints against first marriages are generally invalid. More
limited restraints that afford a reasonable opportunity for first marriages are usually per-
missible, however. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 6.1-.2
(1983); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 424-425 (1944).
98. E.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
99. To take one notable current controversy, the legality of blacks-only financial assis-
tance for college and university students remains unsettled. See, e.g., Podberesky v. Kirwan,
764 F Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1991), rev'd, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992); Notice of Proposed
Policy Guidance, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,548 (1991); Scott Jaschik, In Bow to Congress, Alexander
Delays Issuing Final Guidelines on Minority Scholarships, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 17,
1992, at A21.
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As its first alternative contention, the Foundation might have
claimed that the restriction violated a federal civil rights statute
which prohibits racial discrimination in the acquisition and hold-
ing of both real and personal property 100 That Reconstruction law
protects whites who are penalized for associating with blacks.101
Moreover, the statute prohibits purely private discrimination.1 2
The argument would proceed as follows: the Adams trust conferred
a property interest upon the Foundation; the whites-only provision
seeks to prevent the Foundation from treating blacks equally with
whites; hence, giving effect to the whites-only provision would de-
prive the Foundation of its property interest in the trust solely be-
cause of the race of some of the students enrolled in the private
academy Whether or not the forfeiture resulted from state action,
therefore, it would violate the statute. 03
If this argument failed, the Foundation might have advanced an-
other one based squarely upon venerable property and trust law
concepts. Traditional doctrine holds that some property restric-
tions that do not violate the Constitution nevertheless can be un-
lawful as contrary to public policy For example, many restraints
on alienation and marriage are invalid under common law princi-
ples without regard to constitutional or statutory considerations. 0 4
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988) ("All citizens of the United States shall have the same right,
in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.").
101. E.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 434 (1973); Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969); Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d
1198, 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1982); Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844, 845 (4th Cir. 1980); Bishop v.
Pecsok, 431 F Supp. 34, 37 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F Supp. 282, 286
(E.D. Ky. 1976); Walker v. Pointer, 304 F Supp. 56, 58-62 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
102. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
103. The Foundation also might have argued that a related Reconstruction statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (amended 1991), prevented it from refusing admission to nonwhite stu-
dents. The Foundation was legally bound by the judgment in the leading case on the issue.
See supra note 30. Indeed, any attempt by the Adams trustee to compel the Foundation to
maintain a discriminatory admissions policy might itself violate § 1981 as a racially moti-
vated effort to prevent the establishment of a contractual relationship between the Founda-
tion and prospective nonwhite students. See, e.g., Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d
1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1989); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 765 F Supp. 461, 471-72
(N.D. Ill. 1991).
104. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 4.1-.4, 6.1-.3,
7.1-.2 (1983); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 406-417, 424-432 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 153 (1959).
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Of particular significance, "restraints [upon property] designed to
enforce racial segregation in a jurisdiction where such segr[e]gation
is deemed adverse to the public interest" fell into the category of
invalid restrictions well before the creation of the Adams trust."5
Although segregation was legally mandated in Virginia for a con-
siderable period, those laws have long since been repealed or over-
turned.10 6 Indeed, the trust was established in reaction to, if not in
defiance of, Brown v. Board of Education,0 7 which rejected legally
mandated segregated schooling. Today, then, a powerful argument
can be made that a whites-only restriction on an educational insti-
tution offends "deeply and widely accepted views of elementary
justice" and therefore violates "fundamental public policy "1 The
argument gains added force because the restriction at issue in Her-
mitage Methodist Homes applied to what purported to be a chari-
table trust. Trusts containing provisions that violate public policy
are not charitable. 10 9 Once again, the state-action question would
not affect the analysis. Instead, applying these traditional princi-
ples would lead to the conclusion that the racial restriction was
invalid.
This conclusion would not completely resolve the controversy
Rejecting the whites-only provision on either statutory or common
law grounds still would have required the court to decide whether
to excise the restriction or declare that the entire conveyance had
failed. The Foundation certainly would have argued for the former
approach, and it could have invoked respectable supporting au-
thority for eliminating the offending provision while leaving the
underlying interest unfettered."10 Preoccupation with constitu-
105. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 437 cmt. c(4) (1944).
106. See infra notes 115 & 124.
107. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
108. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983).
109. See, e.g., 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 43, § 377, at 308.
110. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 6.1(1), .2
(1983); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 424 cmt. d (1944). Of particular relevance is a line of
cases in which courts have excised racial restrictions from educational and other charitable
trusts. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921
(1968); United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975); Wacho-
via Bank & Trust Co. v. Buchanan, 346 F Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 487 F.2d
1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966). These cases have relied upon the doctrines of deviation and cy pres. See RESTATE-
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tional questions, in short, might have diverted attention from al-
ternative, but less glamorous, arguments that could have led to a
different result. As Part II demonstrates, however, the better rule
is to make the decision on the basis of the grantor's intent. Such
an analysis would not have helped the Foundation. Inferences
about intent do not depend upon the grounds for striking the ra-
cial restriction. The available evidence suggests that Jack Adams
would have preferred that the Foundation's interest fail completely
and that the nursing home benefit from the trust income if the
racial restriction were invalid for any reason. The approach advo-
cated here, therefore, probably would have led to the same result
that the Virginia Supreme Court reached.111
In a final effort to avoid this outcome, the Foundation might
have claimed that the Academy's unchallenged admission of sev-
eral Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese pupils some years earlier
amounted to a waiver of the whites-only restriction. The presence
of those pupils was widely known, having been mentioned in a na-
tional magazine article in 197912 and in the Academy's own news-
paper in 1984. 13 Moreover, the Foundation's application for resto-
ration of its federal tax exemption cited the admission of these
nonwhite children as evidence of its nondiscriminatory policies.114
Thus, the absence of objection probably did not result from igno-
rance of the prior breach. 15
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 381, 399 (1959). See generally BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note
43, §§ 396, 438-439; 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 43, §§ 381, 399.2-.4A.
These cases would not have helped the Foundation. The state supreme court refused to
apply cy pres because it was not necessary to prevent the Adams trust from failing; the
unrestricted gift over to the nursing home assured that some charity would benefit under
the express terms of the trust. Hermitage Methodist Homes of Va., Inc. v. Dominion Trust
Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 746-47 (Va.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 907 (1990). The deviation doctrine
is "analogous but not as extensive" as cy pres, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt.
a, so reliance upon that doctrine would not have produced a different outcome.
111. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
112. John Egerton, A Gentlemen's Fight, AM. HERITAGE, Aug.-Sept. 1979, at 56, 62.
113. Academy Seeks To Regain Federal Tax Exempt Status, THE REPORTER (Prince Ed-
ward Academy), Dec. 1984, at 1, 6, reproduced in 1985 Hearing, supra note 30, at 179, 184.
114. Prince Edward School Foundation, IRS Form 1023, May 29, 1985, app. I, reproduced
in 1985 Hearing, supra note 30, at 165, 204.
115. Cf. Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 58 A.2d 89, 96-97 (N.J. Ch.) (holding that a
grantee may not defend its subsequent breach of a restriction by claiming that the grantor's
failure to object to a prior breach represented waiver when it was not clear that the grantor
knew of the prior breach), aff'd per curiam, 64 A.2d 347 (N.J. 1948).
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This defense would not have succeeded, however, on two
grounds. First, an estate on limitation-a fee simple determinable
or, as in Hermitage Methodist Homes, a fee simple subject to exec-
utory limitation-expires automatically upon breach of the restric-
tion. Because the holder of the future interest need take no affirm-
ative step to effect the forfeiture, the doctrine of waiver does not
apply 116 Second, even if the waiver doctrine did apply, many
courts have held that failure to object to one breach does not pre-
clude objection to a subsequent one. 117 Under this reasoning, the
earlier matriculation of the Asian pupils would not defeat a claim
that the admission of blacks violated the terms of the Adams trust.
V CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Hermitage Methodist Homes illustrates the vices of the tradi-
tional approach to defeasible fees. Emphasizing form over sub-
stance, the decision turned upon the artificial distinction between
limitations and conditions subsequent. The logic of that distinction
effectively insulates some notably obnoxious racial restrictions
from constitutional attack. This fact alone is not necessarily a dis-
positive argument for abandoning the distinction, because most
It is also improbable that the Asian Americans were regarded as white. When the Adams
trust was established, the relevant Virginia statute, which was frankly intended to preserve
racial purity, classified Asians as nonwhite. Only those persons having "no trace whatever of
any blood other than Caucasian" qualified as white. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (Michie 1950)
(repealed 1968). The leading case upholding that statute involved the marriage of a Chinese
man and a white woman. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Va.), vacated, 350 U.S. 891
(1955), adhered to on remand, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va.), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
The law was repealed after the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See infra note 124.
116. Colby v. Sun Oil Co., 288 S.W.2d 221, 223-24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Milton I. Gold-
stein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land,
54 HARV. L. REV. 248, 272 (1940); Howard R. Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land:
Conditions Subsequent and Determinable Fees, 27 TEx. L. REV. 158, 177 (1948). A possibil-
ity of reverter or an executory interest might be lost if the holder fails to act within the
statute of limitations and the holder of the fee has satisfied the requirements of adverse
possession. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 69, § 2.7, at 53; Dunham, supra note 12, at 229;
Goldstein, supra, at 272. There apparently was no basis for such a claim in Hermitage
Methodist Homes.
117. 1 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 42, § 258, at 308 & n.98 (citing cases).
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whites-only property restrictions are otherwise unlawful or
unenforceable.""l
Nevertheless, this episode vividly underscores the mischief that
the limitation-condition distinction can cause. Lawyers and judges
believe that the distinction matters, but they are too often con-
fused by the arcana of essentially meaningless labels. Defeasible
fees are misclassified with distressing frequency, thereby further
blurring the distinction. In fact, parties to defeasible estates have
every incentive to behave in the same fashion regardless of the la-
bels attached to their interests. Whatever justification originally
existed for the limitation-condition distinction therefore is no
longer adequate.
The difficulty is not merely analytical confusion or wrong deci-
sions, although those problems exist. The real issue is that the lim-
itation-condition distinction allows courts to hide their reasoning
behind a semantic cloud. Hermitage Methodist Homes graphically
exemplifies this phenomenon. Although there were respectable ar-
guments for a different outcome, the case came out correctly In
the process, however, the state supreme court squandered an op-
portunity to help Virginia come to terms with one of its most pain-
ful historical episodes.
This was, after all, a compelling case. Who could have antici-
pated that the Prince Edward School Foundation, which was es-
118. Both federal and state law prohibit most race-based property restrictions. For exam-
ple, the federal Fair Housing Act forbids race-based refusals to sell or rent. 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(1988). That Act applies only to residential property, however, and many dwellings are ex-
empt from its coverage. See id. § 3603. Another federal statute prohibits racial discrimina-
tion in both real and personal property transactions. Id. § 1982; see supra notes 100-03 and
accompanying text. Several state laws governing real property provide that racial restric-
tions embodied in limitations and conditions subsequent are void. HAw. REv. STAT. § 515-
6(b) (1985 & Supp. 1991); ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 775, § 5/3-105(B)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 23B (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2505(1)
(West 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-604(b) (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.224(1)
(West 1990).
Nevertheless, such provisions still exist, as does debate over whether it is lawful to record
deeds and other instruments containing racial restrictions. Compare Mayers v. Ridley, 465
F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) with Woodward v. Bowers, 630 F Supp. 1205 (M.D.
Pa. 1986). A minor controversy arose over then-Justice Rehnquist's failure to remove re-
strictive covenants from the deeds to properties that he owned, an action he thought unnec-
essary due to the restrictions' legal insignificance. Nomination of Justice William Hubbs
Rehnquist: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 180-
81, 229-30 (1986).
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tablished by die-hard segregationists who fiercely challenged fed-
eral antidiscrimination efforts for almost thirty years, would ever
seriously argue to the highest court in the birthplace of Massive
Resistance that a whites-only educational trust is unconstitu-
tional? This question raises others. Were the Foundation's argu-
ments sincere, or did they simply represent a strategic rhetorical
response to shrinking enrollments at the Academy9 Even if those
arguments were tactical, what significance should we attach to the
Foundation's sacrifice of principle for principal? Should the court
have effectively penalized a segregation academy for abandoning
its racial exclusivity, whatever its reasons for doing so 9
There are no obvious or easy answers to these questions. The
Foundation has persistently denied that it harbors malice against
blacks, although Academy officials avowed support of segregated
schooling until shortly before the African-American pupils were
admitted.11 Many local blacks, recalling the Foundation's origins,
view it as a racist institution and doubt that it has really
changed. 120 Perhaps answering those questions was not absolutely
necessary to decide the Hermitage Methodist Homes case. But
confronting the past by focusing upon Jack Adams' intent might
have led to explicit consideration of the meaning of Massive Resis-
tance and its contemporary relevance. At some point, the Com-
monwealth of Virginia must come to terms with that period of its
history, just as the federal government has acknowledged the
wrongs it perpetrated against citizens of Japanese ancestry during
World War 11121 and emerging democratic polities in other nations
119. The Academy's long-time headmaster was quoted in a 1984 book by a sympathetic
author as saying that "[m]ost blacks simply do not have the ability to do quality school
work." WOLTERS, supra note 27, at 98. That statement was consistent with his comment in a
1979 television interview that, because "'each of the two races, being a little different cul-
ture and a little different background, the best quality of education can be obtained if
they are educated separately.'" 1985 Hearzng, supra note 30, at 40 (statement of Carl T.
Rowan, who conducted the taped interview in which.the comment was made).
120. See 1986 Hearing, supra note 30, at 40-55 (statement and testimony of James E.
Ghee); Evans, supra note 32.
121. Several convictions that the Supreme Court upheld at the time were later vacated.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d
1496 (9th Cir. 1985); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). More
recently, a federal statute formally apologized for the treatment of Japanese Americans and
authorized payment of compensation to World War II internees. Act of Aug. 10, 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989-1989d (1988)). This statute
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have struggled to deal with violations of human rights committed
by recently discredited dictators.122 To be sure, individual white
Virginians have come to understand what was wrong with segrega-
tion, and an African American won the last gubernatorial elec-
tion. 23 In addition, the legislature repealed some old segregation
statutes, but it did so only after the federal courts had found those
measures unconstitutional. 2 4 It is also true that a speech by Gov-
ernor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., in January 1959 marked the end of
Massive Resistance at the state level, but that speech included the
standard segregationist condemnation of integration and was deliv-
ered several months before Prince Edward County closed its
schools. 2 5
The dispute over the Adams trust, in other words, could have
been the occasion for an important state governmental institution
has survived a constitutional challenge. Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 95 (1992).
122. See, e.g., LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE (1990); Diane F Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100
YALE L.J. 2537, 2542-44 (1991).
123. For example, on his retirement from the Supreme Court, Justice Powell, who before,
his appointment had been very active in the conservative Democratic organization that con-
trolled Virginia politics for half a century, expressed amazement that he could have pas-
sively accepted the old racial order. ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE 24 (1989); JOHN P
FRANK, CLEMENT HAYNSWORTH, THE SENATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 135-36 (1991).
Nevertheless, some who accepted the new developments did so with a certain ambiva-
lence. One of Powell's former partners, who represented the Prince Edward County authori-
ties until they closed the public schools in 1959, lamented that the attorneys who challenged
segregation in Brown had been afforded numerous professional opportunities that those who
defended the practice had not. John W Riely, Brown v. The Board: A Very Personal Retro-
spective Glance, VA. LAW., Feb. 1989, at 17, 17 ("Many of the lawyers for the respondents
are dead; many of the lawyers for the petitioners are federal judges."). I am grateful to
David and Debra Palmer for calling this reference to my attention.
124. Although the state supreme court recognized that Brown invalidated school-segrega-
tion requirements, Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636, 644 (Va. 1959), those regulations re-
oained on the books for years afterward. The state constitutional provision mandating seg-
regated schools, VA. CONST. of 1902, art. IX, § 140, survived intact until the adoption of a
new constitution m 1971. The statute implementing this provision, VA. CODE ANN. § 22-221
(Michie 1950), was repealed at about the same time. Act of Feb. 24, 1971, ch. 102, 1971 Va.
Acts 128. Similarly, the segregation requirement for educational trusts was repealed in 1975,
long after its invalidity had become clear. Act of Mar. 22, 1975, ch. 547, § 2, 1975 Va. Acts
1172, 1174.
It did not take as long for the legislature to repeal the state's miscegenation statute, but
that also was done in response to a Supreme Court decision, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967). Act of Apr. 2, 1968, ch. 318, § 2, 1968 Va. Acts 428, 430.
125. ELY, supra note 48, at 123-24; MUSE, supra note 25, at 131-34.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to reflect candidly, possibly for the first time, upon one of the de-
fining moments in Virginia's history That in turn might have
stimulated broader public and political deliberation about this
subject. Perhaps the state supreme court implicitly recognized the
significance of the Hermitage Methodist Homes case by recalling
retired Justice Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., to sit by designation when
the appeal was considered. 2 6 Justice Harrison served on the court
for more than fourteen years after holding various elective offices
for over three decades.127 Of special significance, he had, as attor-
ney general, helped to precipitate the test case that invalidated one
of the centerpieces of Massive Resistance and, as governor, cooper-
ated with arrangements that provided formal training to Prince
Edward's black children during the last year that the public
schools were closed.128 The resulting opinion, unhappily, suggests
that the underlying events are still too disquieting for forthright
discussion.129
Ultimately, then, Hermitage Methodist Homes exemplifies in
the starkest terms what is really wrong with the limitation-condi-
tion distinction. Few cases raise such elemental questions as this
one did. The availability of an already discredited doctrine to ob-
scure those questions provides a powerful additional reason finally
to abandon the limitation-distinction and unify the law of defeasi-
ble fees once and for all.
126. There was a vacancy on the court when Hermitage Methodist Homes was heard. The
recall of a retired justice to sit by designation in such circumstances was authorized by VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 17-7 to -7.01 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1992).
127. For a panegyrical review of Harrison's career, see Ceremony for the Presentation of
the Portrait of The Honorable Albertis Sydney Harrison, Jr., Justice of the Supreme Court
of Virginia, 228 Va. xxxv (1984).
128. On the background to the test case, Harrison, 106 S.E.2d 636, see ELY, supra note
48, at 75-76; MusE, supra note 25, at 103-06. On Harrison's role in the establishment of the
"free schools" for black children, see ELY, supra note 48, at 138, 174; SMITH, supra note 25,
at 238-40.
On the other hand, Harrison's selection as the designated justice in Hermitage Methodist
Homes may have been entirely coincidental. He participated in approximately a dozen other
cases at the same session and had been sitting by designation on a sporadic basis since his
retirement eight years earlier.
129. Official silence may not be possible very much longer. The Virginia Council for the
Humanities and Public Policy recently made a grant to support production of a documen-
tary film about the events in Prince Edward County.
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